Trust and reciprocity: extensions and robustness of triadic design

Our paper reconsiders the triadic design proposed by Cox (Games and Economic Behavior 46:260–281, 2004) to identify trust and reciprocity in investment games. Specifically, we extend the design in two directions. First, we collect information on investors’ choices by using both the direct-response (as does Cox) and strategy methods. Using the latter, we are able to condition reciprocity on initial inequality, which is endogenous when investigating reciprocity. We demonstrate that the triadic design provides evidence for reciprocity once that initial inequality is considered. Second, we elicit expectations and test their coherence with the triadic outcomes. By examining the relationship between trust actions and expected gains, we analyze whether investors’ expectations are consistent with their behavior. Finally, we test for the existence of an emotional bias, i.e., whether expectation mismatches induce trustees to change actual choices from the planned ones.     

Production Theory: Accounting for Firm Heterogeneity and Technical Change

The paper presents a new framework to assess firm level heterogeneity and to study the rate and direction of technical change. Building on the analysis of revealed short‐run production functions by Hildenbrand ( 1981 ), we propose the (normalized) volume of the zonotope composed by vectors‐firms as indicator of inter‐firm heterogeneity. Moreover, the angles that the zonotope's main diagonal form with the axes provide a measure of the rates and directions of productivity change. The proposed framework also accounts for n‐inputs and m‐outputs and, crucially, the measures of heterogeneity and technical change do not require many of the standard assumptions from production theory.     

Multiple equilibria and global indeterminacy in an endogenous growth model with congestible public goods

This paper extends the findings in Chen and Lee (2007) to show that the use of congestible public goods can produce both local and global indeterminacy in a two‐sector endogenous growth model with productive public services financed by income taxation. Basically, we observe the effects on growth rates by changing parameters, and compare the case of a single steady‐state with the emergence of dual steady‐states, identifying the feasible ways to avoid a possible low‐growth poverty trap. The novelty of our analysis is to detect the presence of global indeterminacy by making use of the Bogdanov‐Takens bifurcation theorem. Some examples are also provided to achieve concrete policy implications.     

A search model for Joint Implementation

The aim of this paper is to present a search model in the field of environmental economics, where so-called clean and dirty producers enter the trading market, both looking for a partner with whom to exchange the goods they are endowed with. The model derived in this paper is rather simple. Nevertheless, it is able to produce a series of interesting results and useful insights, and is conveniently used here as a framework to explain the functioning of Joint Implementation programs for polluting emissions＇ reduction.     

Place the good after the bad: effects of emotional shifts on consumer memory

Marketing research has a limited understanding about the effects arising from emotional shifts (i.e., the transition from one emotion to another) during the same advertising message. This paper sheds light on this topic through two studies. Study 1 examines whether an advertising message that features a negative-to-positive emotional shift (i.e., a shift from a negative to a positive emotion) generates greater recall of an advertised brand than an advertising message with a neutral-to-positive emotional shift (i.e., a shift from a neutral to a positive emotion) or one with no emotional shift. Study 2 examines whether an advertising message that simulates a buyer-seller encounter—with the seller reproducing a negative-to-positive emotional shift via facial expressions—generates a greater recall of the advertised content than an identical advertisement with no emotional shift. Results confirm that a negative-to-positive shift facilitates the recall of both the brand and the advertised information.     

Did immigration contribute to wage stagnation of unskilled workers?

In this paper we first show that the timing and skill distribution of Immigrants to the U.S. between 1970 and 2014 imply they did not contribute to the decline in the wages of native, non-college educated workers – including high school dropouts – at the national level. We then review other evidence at the local level, which implies immigration is not associated with lower non-college wages. Rather, higher immigration seems associated with higher average (and college-level) wages. Local externalities, complementarities, efficient specialization and appropriate technological choice suggest at least part of the positive association is causal.     

ON TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION: A FORMAL ANALYSIS OF THE ‘SAILING-SHIP EFFECT’

One of the key features of our economies consists of the coexistence of different technologies supplying similar products and services. We often observe that an old technology is improved when a new one appears; behind this process of improvement often lies an intentional research activity. There thus begins a competition between the two technologies whose performances are improved via R&D. We focus our attention on this competition process and supply a formal model, based on the optimization of R&D expenditure of both technologies, which can describe the dynamics of the delayed overtaking of the new technology over the old one.     

Partnership,reciprocity and team design

This paper studies the effect of intention-based reciprocity preferences on the free-riding problem arising in partnerships. Our results suggest a tendency of efficient partnerships to consist of members whose sensitivity to reciprocity is – individually or jointly – sufficiently high. Sufficient conditions for the implementation of the efficient strategy profile require a reciprocity-based sharing rule so that each partner gets a fraction of the output, which is a percentage of his own sensitivity to reciprocity with respect to the overall sensitivity in the team. Finally, we introduce the concept of psychological strong Nash equilibrium and show that it allows for the unique and collusion-proof implementation of the efficient strategy profile.